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Abstract: Which traits are beautiful? And is their beauty perceptual? It is 
argued that moral virtues are partly beautiful to the extent that they tend 
to give rise to a special emotion—ecstasy—and that compassion tends to 
be more beautiful than fair-mindedness because it tends to give rise to this 
emotion to a greater extent. It is then argued, on the basis that emotions 
are best thought of as a special, evaluative kind of perception, that this 
argument suggests that moral virtues are partly beautiful to the extent that 
they tend to give rise to a certain kind of evaluative perceptual experience.  
§1. Introduction  
After two centuries of neglect, the moral beauty theses, and particularly the form of the thesis 
which says that virtuous moral character is beautiful in itself, are enjoying a renaissance (see for 
example McGinn [1999]; Gaut [2007]; Paris [2018a], [2018b], [2020]; Doran [2021]). 
 Despite this growing body of work suggesting that moral virtue is, in itself, beautiful, a 
number of important questions remain to be settled, principally: Which moral virtues, and indeed 
non-moral traits, are beautiful? And why are such traits beautiful when indeed they are? 
 Some of the existing answers that have been offered to date seem, prima facie, to be 
inconsistent with one another. With respect to the first question, some, such as Kant [1764], have 
suggested that beauty is only found in “warm” traits, whereas others, such as Gaut [2007], have 
suggested that traits that seem colder, such as intelligence, are beautiful too. 
With respect to the latter question, Paris [2018b, 2020] has defended the view that it is 
sufficient for beauty that something possesses good form and tends to be pleasantly apprehended 
as such, and that virtues generally satisfy this condition. By contrast, McGinn [1999] and Kant 
[1764] defend the stronger view that the tendency to give rise to a special kind of affect which they 
variously term ‘sympathy’, ‘elevation’, and ‘ecstasy’ is necessary and sufficient for beauty; and Kant 
[1764], at least, suggests that only a circumscribed range of virtues tend to give rise to this special 
kind of affect. 
Setting aside these apparent inconsistencies, discussants in these debates, and particularly 
Paris [2018a, 2020] and I [2021], have tended to agree that whatever it is that makes at least some 
traits beautiful, their beauty is not perceptual, since traits do not have any perceptual properties. 
 In this article, I argue in favour of two principal claims. First, I defend the view that these 
tensions are only apparent, because the discussants of moral beauty are, in fact, expressing views 
which range over different kinds of beauty. Where Paris’s [2018b, 2020] view targets a certain thick 
kind of beauty (expressed by BEAUTY-FORM), the special-affect-based accounts are best thought 
of as targeting another thick kind of beauty (expressed by BEAUTY-ECSTASY).  
With this in mind, I suggest that different virtues tend to possess different kinds of beauty, 
and that both of the existing kinds of accounts of the beauty of virtues are needed to explain this. 
To see this, I suggest that we need to recognise that the formalist account is content-neutral 
whereas a suitably formulated form of the special-affect-based account will be at least partly 
content-specific. I then turn to present novel empirical evidence in favour of this idea.  
Second, I suggest that the first argument has consequences for whether beauty is 
perception-dependent. I argue that Paris [2018a] and I [2021] might have been too quick to claim 
that the beauty of virtues is not perceptual. Beauty, in the thick sense of BEAUTY-ECSTASY, may in 
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fact be perceptual, on the grounds that the special kind of affect that is appealed to by affect-based 
theorists is an emotion, and emotions are best thought of as perceptual experiences of evaluative 
properties.  
§2. Existing views of which traits are beautiful and why this is the case 
Supporters of the beauty of traits have differed with respect to how they quantify beauty across 
the domain.  
For those who we might call ‘particularists’ about the beauty of traits, only some virtues 
and non-moral traits are beautiful. Kant [1764: 22–6], for example, suggests that only ‘warm’ traits 
such as being agreeable and tender-hearted are beautiful.1 Similarly, while Burke [1757] explicitly 
claims that moral virtues are not beautiful [101–2], elsewhere he suggests that the traits of being 
weak and vulnerable [100], as well as people with ‘amiable’ and ‘domestic’ virtues [143–4], are 
beautiful (with the latter being beautiful in the context of their demise, at least).  
By contrast, for those who we might call ‘universalists’ about the beauty of traits, all 
virtuous traits, and indeed some non-moral traits are beautiful. Gaut [2007], for example, claims 
that if a trait is virtuous then it is beautiful, and that colder non-moral traits such as ‘being 
intellectually gifted’ are beautiful [120], in addition to warmer traits such as having a sunny 
disposition.  
With respect to the question of why traits are beautiful, when indeed they are, two 
proposals have been made. One answer, which tends to be associated with particularism about the 
beauty of traits, is that traits are beautiful when they are disposed to give rise to a special kind of 
affective state, which is variously called ‘sympathy’, ‘elevation’, and ‘ecstasy’, among other terms.  
Kant [1764: 22–3, 36, 44] suggests that traits are beautiful to the extent that they are 
loveable and lead to a ‘warm feeling of sympathy’ [22]. For Kant, as soon as such traits are brought 
in line with reason by, say, making ‘general affection towards mankind your principle’, which in 
turn leads you to act in a just fashion by withholding care from the individuals that pique your 
sympathies to be able to fulfil your duties to others, these traits become too ‘cold’ to be beautiful, 
and instead become sublime [23].2  
Similarly, Burke [1757] claims that the weak and vulnerable [100] and those with ‘amiable’ 
and ‘domestic’ virtues [143–4] tend to be beautiful, in virtue of their ability to give rise to what he 
calls ‘love’, which he characterizes in terms of melting feelings that tend to be expressed by closing 
one’s eyes a little and gently inclining them to the object of that state, opening one’s mouth slightly, 
and taking slow draws of breath and sighing [135–6]. 
McGinn [1999: 110] offers a similar view, which can best be reconstructed as the claim 
that virtues are beautiful because they have the tendency to ‘afford aesthetic bliss’. McGinn [1999] 
thinks that this special state of mind is necessary and sufficient for beauty generally. He 
characterizes this state in a more substantive manner, following Nabokov [1959: 75], as the 
tendency to give rise to ‘a state of mind in which one is connected to other states of being in which 
art is the norm—where art involves curiosity, tenderness, kindness and ecstasy’, and that in these 
‘other worldy states of being’ we are put ‘in contact with certain ideals’.  
A similar suggestion, without McGinn’s weighty metaphysical commitments, has been 
made by psychologists such as Diessner et al. [2008] and Haidt [2000]. They suggest that moral 
 
1 More precisely, Kant [1764] holds that qualities such as tender-heartedness, which are beautiful, are only ‘good moral 
qualities’ [22] or ‘adopted virtues’ [25] as they can prevent people from fulfilling their duties. 
2 Among the other virtues that Kant considers sublime, rather than beautiful, are heroism and courage (e.g. [1764: 22, 
59]). In distinguishing between artificial and natural virtues, Hume may be thought to carve up the virtues in a similar 
manner. Hume seems to differ from Kant, however, in thinking that artificial virtues such as being just are also 
beautiful, and in thinking that, unlike in the case of natural virtues, identifying the beauty of the artificial virtues 
requires recognition of the fact that they tend towards the common good, together with sympathy for the beneficiaries 
of such virtues (see e.g. Hume [1739-1740: 498–500, 577–80, 618]).   
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goodness is only perceived to be beautiful when it gives rise to what they call ‘elevation’, where 
‘elevation’ is a self-transcendent emotion that is paradigmatically characterized by, for example, 
feeling inspired, moved and touched, having a warm feeling in the chest, getting choked up, chills, 
feeling at one with world, thinking that people are fundamentally good, and wanting to be morally 
better (for example, Landis et al. [2009], Algoe and Haidt [2009]; Doran [in press]; Doran [under 
review]; this emotion has also been called ‘kama muta’ by, for example, Zickfeld et al. [2018]). 
Generally, the special-affect-based account, in the strongest form that makes this special 
kind of affect necessary and sufficient for beauty, as put forward by McGinn [1999] and (arguably) 
others such as Kant [1764], can be formulated in the following way, 
 
Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy: A moral capacity, MC, is beautiful, if and only if, MC has the 
disposition to give rise to the special state of mind that has variously been labelled 
‘ecstasy’, ‘elevation’, and ‘sympathy’ etc. (hereafter, just ‘ecstasy’). 
 
A second, formalist, answer, which tends to be associated with universalism about the beauty of 
moral virtues, has been suggested by Paris [2018b, 2020]. Paris [2018b, 2020] argues that if 
something pleases competent judges to the extent that it is well-formed in the sense that it has an 
ensemble of parts that realize its proper function well, then it is beautiful. With this sufficient 
account of beauty in hand, Paris [2018b, 2020] argues that virtues are beautiful on the grounds 
that virtues are complexes of psychological entities such as beliefs and desires that have ends 
insofar as they aim at human goods such as justice (following, for example, Hursthouse [1999], 
and Foot [2001]), and so they are well-formed, and tend to be apprehended with pleasure as such.3 
Or, more formally, 
 
 Moral-Beauty-Form: If a moral capacity, MC, is well-formed in the sense of having a 
constellation of parts that achieve MC’s proper end well, and tends to please as 
such, then, MC is beautiful.   
 
Now, some of these accounts seem to be inconsistent with one another. The ecstasy-based 
accounts that are tied to particularism about moral beauty, such as those offered by Kant [1764] 
and Burke [1757], clearly seem inconsistent with Paris’ [2018b, 2020] formalist account and Gaut’s 
[2007] writings about moral beauty. For, fully just people can be psychologically integrated and 
can surely be received with pleasure as such, and so are beautiful to this extent on Paris’s [2020] 
view, but for Kant [1764] and Burke [1757] at least, they are too cold to be beautiful.  
Turning to the ecstasy-based accounts that are not tied to particularism about moral 
beauty, such as Haidt’s [2000], Diessner et al.’s [2008] and McGinn’s [1999] accounts, the picture 
is a little more complicated.  
Since Haidt [2000] and Diessner et al. [2008] do not specify which features tend to cause 
ecstasy and since they seem to be offering a psychological rather than a metaphysical account, 
these accounts may not be inconsistent with Moral-Beauty-Form. It may be the case, as a matter of 
empirical fact, that the kind of pleasant state that the contemplation of people whose psychological 
faculties are well-integrated in the way specified by Moral-Beauty-Form tends to give rise to is always 
ecstasy.  
By contrast, since McGinn’s [1999] account is explicitly formulated as a metaphysical 
account which offers necessary and sufficient conditions, as in Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy, and since it is 
at least conceivable that the contemplation of virtue in the way specified by Moral-Beauty-Form, as 
defended by Paris [2018b, 2020], might give rise to a kind of pleasant state that is not identical to 
ecstasy, then, prima facie, Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy looks like it is inconsistent with Moral-Beauty-Form. 
 
3 A similar formalist answer has been suggested with respect to the beauty of fair states of affairs. Scarry [2006: 63, 
65] suggests, for example, that as justice as fairness is, as Rawls puts it, ‘a symmetry of everyone’s relations to each 
other’ it possesses the ‘attribute most steadily singled out over the centuries’ to make for beauty. 
 4 
For, suppose that someone contemplates the formal goodness of virtue with simple pleasure alone. 
Is it, thereby, beautiful? On Paris’s [2018b, 2020] account, the answer would be ‘yes’, but on 
McGinn’s [1999] at least, the answer would be ‘no’. 
§3. Why aren’t the existing views inconsistent? 
Despite these appearances of inconsistency (such as they are), I submit that both Moral-Beauty-Form 
and Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy are true, when the latter is formulated in the right kind of way. I suggest 
that the source of the apparent inconsistencies, such as they are, derives from the fact that the 
accounts range over different kinds of beauty, as expressed by different concepts of beauty.  
Which concepts of beauty do Moral-Beauty-Form and Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy intend to target? 
In contrast to one thin concept of beauty—BEAUTY-AESTHETIC—according to which any 
aesthetically positive quality, such as being amusing or sublime, is beautiful, Paris [2020: 519] 
explicitly claims that virtuous individuals are beautiful in a thicker sense of beauty—BEAUTY-
FORM—according to which something is beautiful if it is pleasant to the extent that it is well-
formed.  
Supporters of Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy, and indeed other ecstasy-based accounts, do not 
explicitly specify which concept of beauty they intend, but I suggest that they are best understood 
as intending another thick concept of beauty—BEAUTY-ECSTASY—which expresses the property 
that is possessed by many of the kinds of things that are listed in contrasts of the beautiful and the 
sublime, including, as noted by Burke [1757: 102–7] and Kant [1764: 14–8], the smooth, small, 
delicate, mild-coloured and things with gradual variation, such as grey-hounds, rolling hills, 
meadows strewn with flowers, and meandering rivers. As Passmore [1951: 331] and Zangwill 
[2001: 11] note, the paintings of, for example, Constable tend to have this kind of beauty, but 
those of Goya do not. 
It is unlikely that the set of things that possess this property have anything in common 
with one another apart from a tendency to give rise to the special kind of state of mind discussed 
in §2 above. Burke [1757: 135–45], Wordsworth [1811-2: 349], and Passmore [1951: 331], for 
example, note that such beauties invite loving, gentle, soothing and melting responses—for 
example, smooth things invite being caressed, delicate things invite gentle handling, and the 
appreciation of such kinds of objects tends to involve a melting feeling. Indeed, as we have seen, 
Burke [1757] claims that beauty just is that which tends to give rise to unitive feelings that tend to 
be expressed by closing one’s eyes a little and gently inclining them to the object of this state, 
opening one’s mouth slightly, and taking slow draws of breath and sighing [135–6]. 
Although this sense of beauty is not lexically marked in Indo-European languages such as 
English and German, it is lexically marked in languages from other linguistic families, such as the 
Japonic and Papuan family. The Iatmul of the East Sepik region of Papua New Guinea’s word for 
beauty—“yigen”—is translated by Bateson [1958: 141] as ‘beautiful, gentle and quiet’; and a family 
of Japanese lexical constructs seem to express aspects or determinates of this thick sense, including 
‘mono no aware’ and ‘wabi-sabi’. Among such Japanese lexical items, “yūgen” seems to come the 
closest to expressing the thickest sense of beauty, in referring to the beauty of human suffering, 
profound truths, and ‘gentle gracefulness’ (see, for example, Ortolani [1990: 125–6], and Tsubaki 
[1971: 55]). 
If this is right, and if we think of the lexical item ‘beauty’ (and related items such as 
‘beautiful’) as expressing a determinable concept—BEAUTY—whose determinates include (though 
may not be limited to) BEAUTY-AESTHETIC, BEAUTY-FORM, and BEAUTY-ECSTASY, then Moral-
Beauty-Ecstasy needs to be formulated as a sufficient account in the following manner: 
 
Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy*: If a moral capacity, MC, has the disposition to give rise to 
ecstasy, then MC is beautiful.   
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To see how Moral-Beauty-Form and Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy* respectively explain different cases of the 
beauty of virtues, it is helpful to see how the two kinds of account differ with respect to content-
neutrality.  
On Moral-Beauty-Form, considered by itself, moral traits should only differ with respect to 
their beauty just to the extent that they please to a different degree by having a greater harmony 
of parts insofar as, for example, some of their components or constellations thereof achieve the 
relevant virtue’s proper function better. There isn’t any reason to think that the kind of virtue an 
individual possesses should make a difference to their beauty. Indeed, in explaining why his 
formalist proposal is more adequate than Parsons and Carlson’s [2008] proposal, Paris [2020] 
demonstrates his proposal’s commitment to content-neutrality. He suggests that while much 
pornography is fit for its function of arousing audiences in the way that it, for example, highlights 
erogenous features, and is often pleasing to watch [520], the pleasure is primarily due to the 
arousing ‘depicted content’ rather than the way that the pornography achieves its end of arousing, 
and so is not beautiful to that extent [522]. With this in mind, it should be clear how Moral-Beauty-
Form is well-placed to accommodate certain cases of the beauty of moral traits. 
Compare the fully compassionate individual with the merely continently compassionate 
individual.4 The merely continently compassionate individual recognizes that they should be 
compassionate because it is the right thing to do, but have not yet brought their affective 
tendencies in harmony with this belief. They rarely feel the kinds of tender feelings that would lead 
them to act in compassionate ways, and often desire to act instead in a self-interested fashion. 
Notwithstanding this, through strength of will, they regularly overcome their tendencies to act in 
self-serving ways, in order to alleviate the suffering of others. The fully compassionate individual, 
by contrast, recognizes that they should be compassionate because it is the right thing to do, and 
this is in harmony with their affective tendencies. They always feel tender towards the victims of 
harms, desire to act to alleviate the suffering of others because it is the right thing to do, and will 
themselves to act in this fashion. 
Now, the fully compassionate person seems to be more beautiful than the merely 
continently compassionate individual, and Moral-Beauty-Form is well placed to accommodate this 
difference. While both the constellation of beliefs and affective dispositions in the continently and 
the fully compassionate individuals achieve the end of compassion in leading to care for harmed 
individuals, they do not achieve it equally well. In line with Moral-Beauty-Form, the difference between 
the two constellations in how well they achieve the proper end of compassion is formal: the 
virtuous person’s rational and affective dispositions all act in harmony with one another to orient 
them towards others in the right kind of way. Indeed, insofar as the merely continently 
compassionate person fashions themselves into a more morally beautiful individual by bringing 
their reason and affective dispositions into harmony with one another, the merely continently 
compassionate person is behaving in an analogous manner to the artist who manipulates paint on 
a canvas to create harmonious forms. This explains why universalism is true of BEAUTY-FORM, 
and thereby, BEAUTY (by determinable inheritance): since any kind of virtue, and perhaps other 
psychologically complex capacities such as intelligence, can be more or less formally integrated 
and pleasing to that extent, any kind of virtue, and perhaps any kind of complex psychological 
capacity, can be beautiful.   
However, given its commitment to content-neutrality, not all of the beauty of moral traits 
can be easily accommodated in terms of Moral-Beauty-Form.  
Compare the fully compassionate individual to the fully just individual; someone who 
differs from the fully compassionate individual in terms of why they are virtuous, but not in how 
well they achieve their particular virtue. The fully just individual recognizes that they should be fair 
and ensure fairness prevails where possible because it is right, and this is in harmony with their 
affective tendencies. They always feel angry when they see someone being cheated or otherwise 
 
4 For a discussion of the fully virtuous versus the merely continent see e.g. Foot [1978: 10]. 
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unfairly treated, and desire to act in a way which brings restitution to the victims because it is the 
right thing to do, and resolve themselves to act in this fashion. 
While such a just individual is certainly morally excellent, it doesn’t seem to be fully apt to 
describe them as ‘beautiful’ as such. Indeed, such an idea is borne out by ordinary usage of ‘beauty’ 
and ‘beautiful’ in English and German, as evident in certain eighteenth-century claims about 
beauty, as we have already encountered. As we have seen, for particularists about beauty, such as 
Kant [1764: 22–23, 36, 44, 59], not only are warm-hearted traits such as being kind, sympathetic 
and agreeable more beautiful than traits such as fair-mindedness and courageousness, but these 
latter traits are not thought to be beautiful at all, and are instead claimed to be sublime. 
If fully virtuous compassionate individuals are indeed at least more beautiful than fully 
virtuous just individuals, as these considerations suggest, then Moral-Beauty-Form doesn’t seem to 
have the ability to accommodate this difference. In each case, the constellation of psychological 
components achieve the proper functions of the respective virtues equally well, and so, to the 
extent that each is received with equal pleasure to that extent, they should be equally beautiful. 
By contrast, Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy* is not, at least in principle, committed to content-
neutrality, and so there is no obstacle to it being able to accommodate the fact that fully 
compassionate individuals seem to be more beautiful than fully just individuals. Indeed, there is at 
least some reason to think that Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy* should, in fact, be at least partly content-specific, 
and that it should suggest that fully compassionate individuals will in fact be more beautiful than 
fully just individuals.  
The reason for this is that there tends to be a complementarity, or even a symmetry, 
between the components of the ecstasy response and many of the properties that tend to make 
for beauty in the sense of BEAUTY-ECSTASY. Indeed, in light of this complementary, it is likely that 
in appreciating beauty in the sense of BEAUTY-ECSTASY, we make ourselves into a mirror of the 
beautiful object, and we “feel into” the beauty—as suggested by Lipps [1903] with his notion of 
‘einfühlung’. 
To see this complementarity, consider the following. As we have already seen, and as Burke 
[1757: 102–7] and Kant [1764: 14–8] note, beauty in the sense of BEAUTY-ECSTASY is typically 
found in, for example, the smooth, small, delicate, mild-coloured and things with gradual variation, 
such as grey-hounds, rolling hills, meadows strewn with flowers, and meandering rivers. And as 
Burke [1757: 135–45] also notes, many of these beauties are beautiful because they invite tender, 
gentle and melting responses—for example, smooth things invite being caressed, delicate things 
invite gentle handling, and the appreciation of such kinds of objects tends to involve the melting 
feelings common to the ecstasy response.  
Moreover, looking specifically at the traits that tend to be found to at least be especially 
beautiful (if not exclusively so), as we have just seen, for Kant [1764] and Burke [1757], it is the 
gentle and soft traits, and those that invite or tend to lead to unity between people, such as cases 
of being vulnerable and compassionate, that are beautiful to the extent that they in turn elicit the 
gentle, soft, and unitive ecstasy response.  
From this, it might be tempting to think that Kant [1764] is right to think that the virtue 
of justice is not beautiful, and indeed that particularism about the beauty of traits is true, at least 
vis-à-vis BEAUTY-ECSTASY. This thought does not seem to be likely to be correct, however, as the 
complementarity between the properties of beauty in the sense of BEAUTY-ECSTASY and the 
ecstasy response extends to cases of moral beauty that might seem to most obviously be beautiful 
in the sense of BEAUTY-FORM.  
Some of the features of virtue generally (irrespective of the kind of virtue they are) that 
seem likely to contribute to their beauty—such as being other-regarding, and involving the 
overcoming of self-serving inclinations—also appear in the ecstasy response, which is partly 
characterized by feelings of transcending the self, and of wanting to orient oneself in a moral 
fashion towards others, and may therefore, tend towards this response too. 
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Moreover, just as virtues are partly beautiful to the extent that there is a harmony or unity 
between the constellation of psychological capacities that make up virtues, the ecstasy response 
tends to involve a sense of the world being harmonious and, indeed, of a sense of unity with the 
beautiful object, and sometimes through it, with everything, and so such harmony or unity may 
tend towards the ecstasy response too.  
With these clarifications, it should be clear that there is reason to think that universalism 
will be true of BEAUTY-ECSTASY too: since instances of any kind of virtue are harmoniously 
integrated to some extent, and are likely to be other-regarding, instances of any kind of virtue are 
likely to possess some modicum of the disposition to lead to ecstasy, and so are likely to be 
beautiful in the sense of BEAUTY-ECSTASY to some extent. This remains true even if instances of 
specific virtues like compassion have a greater such disposition by having further—virtue-
specific—features that also tend in the direction of giving rise to ecstasy.  
Finally, for this same reason, and as ecstasy is often pleasant, it is also likely that the kind 
of pleasant state that even BEAUTY-FORM gives rise to will tend to be ecstasy as a matter of fact; even 
if (as noted earlier), logically at least, it is possible that the mere pleasant apprehension of good 
form is sufficient for beauty, as per Moral-Beauty-Form. 
§3. Empirically supporting these views 
Until now, I have argued that the apparent inconsistency between existing accounts of the beauty 
of traits could be resolved by recognizing that Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy (and perhaps other ecstasy-
based accounts of moral beauty) is best thought of as targeting a certain thick concept of beauty—
BEAUTY-ECSTASY—and that it should be formulated as a sufficient account—Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy*. 
In making the argument for this claim, and specifically, in tracing how Moral-Beauty-Form 
and Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy* help to explain the beauty of different cases of moral beauty, a number 
of claims were made from the armchair, by appealing to certain philosopher’s intuitions, including 
most importantly, the claims that fully compassionate individuals are more beautiful than fully just 
individuals, and that this is because the former tend to give rise to ecstasy to a greater extent. These 
claims would benefit from empirical support. Although these claims are metaphysical, and so not 
directly testable, it is surely right that if they are correct then we should expect that the folk will 
respond in accordance with them, at least insofar as they are competent users of the concept 
BEAUTY, and not labouring under some impairment; and that to the extent that this is true (or 
false), the claims are supported (or unsupported, respectively). Indeed, empirical methods are all 
the more relevant in this particular context, given that many discussants of moral beauty agree that 
the responses of the folk are relevant in casting light on the nature of moral beauty, provided the 
aforementioned conditions hold (see, for example, Paris [2018a], Doran [2021]). 
To see whether the folk would respond in line with the claims made in §2., an empirical 
study was conducted. Ethical approval for this study was granted by the University of Sheffield. 
Supplementary materials are available at (https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/24Q5F). 
Materials & Methods: A sample size of 300 was decided upon (for the reasons this sample 
size as targeted, see Supplementary Materials). 312 participants from the online participants 
recruitment platform Prolific took part, and 12 participants were excluded as they failed the 
attention check, leaving a final sample of 300 (52% women, 47% men; mean age=35, SD=12).   
Participants were randomly assigned to a control, fairness or compassion condition, in 
which they were asked to vividly imagine the scenario described in the vignette presented to them 
(see Supplementary Materials, I, for the vignettes used). In each vignette, a person is described as 
being on their way to an important appointment to secure a loan on the day that a marathon 
happens to be taking place. In the compassion condition, the person is described as missing their 
appointment in order to provide care for the leading runner, who has fallen and injured themselves. 
In the justice condition, the person is described as missing their appointment to ensure that the 
leading runner, who has been cheated by another runner taking a shortcut, is recognized as the 
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winner of the race. In the control condition, the person is described as seeing a runner in the 
marathon on their way to their appointment, and securing the loan needed.  
The main features of interest, as discussed in §2., were manipulated between these 
vignettes in a controlled manner. The people described in all of the vignettes overcame obstacles 
to arrive at positive outcomes, and all of the people described obeyed rules. Within this structure, 
there were a number of differences. The person in the control condition was described as: not 
being as psychologically integrated as the people described in the two moral conditions (in, for 
example, not feeling inclined to follow the rules); following prudential (rather than moral) rules; 
and acting to overcome obstacles in order to benefit themselves rather than others. The people in 
the two moral vignettes were described as both being equally virtuous, and only differed with 
respect to the kind of virtue they displayed (i.e. they were equally formally good). They are 
described as: recognizing the happenings that are morally important (harm, and injustice, 
respectively); affectively responding in the right way to such happenings (they are described as 
hating seeing harm and injustice respectively); being motivated in the right way (they are described 
as desiring to care for harmed people and to ensure that people get treated fairly respectively); 
knowing what the right course of action is (i.e. helping the harmed person and reporting the 
cheating so that fairness prevails respectively); and acting in line with this. These descriptions of 
the virtuous individuals are consistent with descriptions of compassionate and fair individuals in 
the literature on virtue ethics, including those that formalists such as Paris [2020] have relied upon 
(see, for example, Zagzebski [1996: 99, 131, 134, 135–7] on the fair person and the compassionate 
person and on the nature of virtues generally; and Adams [2006: 14–35]). 
Participants were asked to report how ‘virtuous (morally good)’ and ‘beautiful on the 
inside’ the individual described seems to them. Participants were then asked how much ecstasy the 
individual described made them feel, using scales that were developed from existing measures of 
‘elevation’, ‘kama muta’, and of the response to beauty in psychology (for example, Algoe and 
Haidt [2009]; Zickfeld et al. [2018], [2020]; Diessner et al. [2008]), as well as descriptions of the 
phenomenology of ecstatic experiences of beauty in philosophical works (for example, Plato [c. 
370]; Bell [1914]; Laski [1961]; Beardsley [1981]; McGinn [1999]; Doran [under review]; see 
Supplementary Materials, I, for the items). Participants were also asked to rate how “caring or 
compassionate” and how ‘fair-minded and just’ the individual described seemed to see if 
participants categorize the virtues displayed in the vignettes in the same way as virtue ethicists. 
 Results:  
Main analyses: Since the normality assumptions of parametric tests were not met for the 
primary measures of interest (i.e. virtue and internal beauty), Kruskall-Wallis one-way ANOVAs 
and Dunn planned comparisons with Bonferroni corrections to account for multiple tests were 
used to calculate the relevant inferential statistics.5  
Judgements of being a ‘virtuous (morally good) person’ were affected by condition 
(H(2)=103.23, p<.001, η2=.34). Pairwise comparisons indicated that the people described in the 
justice and compassion conditions were judged to be more virtuous than the person described in 
the control condition (justice versus control: p<.001, η2=.49; compassion versus control: p<.001, 
η2=.58), but, crucially, the person described in the justice condition was not judged to be more 
virtuous than the person described in the compassion condition (p=.51, η2=.08).  
Judgements of being ‘beautiful on the inside’ were affected by condition (H(2)=90.85, 
p<.001, η2=.30). Pairwise comparisons indicated that the people described in the justice and 
compassion conditions were judged to be more beautiful on the inside than the person described 
in the control condition (justice versus control: p<.001, η2=.29; compassion versus control: 
p<.001, η2=.59), and, crucially, the person described in the compassion condition was judged to 
be more beautiful on the inside than the person described in the justice condition (p<.001, η2=.29). 
 
5 Parametric tests tend to be robust against violations of their assumptions with larger samples, such as the sample 
for this study; and parametric tests give the same results as those reported here, and so, for ease of interpretation, 
means with 95% confidence intervals are presented in Figure 1. 
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Judgements of being ‘fair-minded and just’ were affected by condition (H(2)=95.85, 
p<.001, η2=.32). Pairwise comparisons indicated that the people described in the justice and 
compassion conditions were judged to be more just than the person described in the control 
condition (justice versus control: p<.001, η2=.55; compassion versus control: p<.001, η2=.48), but 
the person described in the justice condition was not judged to be more just than the person 
described in the compassion condition (p=.58, η2=.07).6  
Judgements of being ‘caring and compassionate’ were affected by condition (H(2)=138.21, 
p<.001, η2=.46). Pairwise comparisons indicated that the people described in the justice and 
compassion conditions were judged to be more compassionate than the person described in the 
control condition (justice versus control: p<.001, η2=.47; compassion versus control: p<.001, 
η2=.70), and the person described in the compassion condition was judged to be more 



























Dimension Reduction Analysis: A principal component analysis using oblique rotation (direct oblimin) 
was conducted on all of the experience scales. Kaiser’s criterion of retaining components with 
eigenvalues that exceed 1 suggested a two-component solution. The item measuring the sense that 
the world is perfect or pure and the item measuring a sense of profundity or meaningfulness loaded 
on both components and so were excluded (with the threshold for loading set at .4, Stevens 
[2002]), and so the PCA was re-run without these variables. Although the eigenvalue for the second 
component fell slightly below 1, two factors were retained as the two components were 
theoretically meaningful. One factor clearly referred to pleasant transformational aspects of 
ecstasy—where we feel delighted, moved, inspired, and at one with the object of the state, and feel 
 
6 The lack of a significant difference in judgements of being “fair-minded and just” between the justice and compassion 
condition is likely the result of the fact that it is more difficult to precisely measure justice in the sense of fairness. As 
noted by Miller (2017) ‘justice’ is often taken to mean what is generally right, and morally good in the sense of what 
we owe to one another, and so this measure likely tracked compassion too.  
  
Figure 1. Graphs showing (a) mean agreement with the judgement that the person described in the 
vignette is ‘beautiful on the inside’, and (b) mean agreement with the judgement that the person 
described in the vignette is ‘a virtuous (morally good) person’, where error bars indicate 95% 
confidence intervals, and the scales run from ‘-4—Strongly disagree’ to ‘4—Strongly agree’.  
(a) (b) 
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a desire to become morally better. A second factor clearly referred to rarefied, and often 
hedonically ambivalent, bodily sensations, such as feeling chills, goosebumps, getting choked up 
and having moist eyes (for details of the loadings, the component correlation matrix, and various 
goodness-of-fit indicators see Supplementary Materials, II).   
 Reliability analyses were run to assess how consistent the items that loaded onto the 
transformational component and the rarefied bodily sensations component are. The set of items 
that loaded onto the pleasant transformational component had a Cronbach’s alpha of .96, and the 
set of items that loaded onto the rarefied sensations component had a Cronbach’s alpha of .83, 
indicating that scales have excellent and good consistency respectively. Therefore, overall 
transformational ecstasy and rarefied sensations scales were composed by taking the mean of the 
relevant items. 
Mediation analyses: To test whether the different conditions affected judgements of moral 
beauty via the components measured, a parallel multiple mediation analysis was conducted using 
ordinary least squares path analysis and robust standard error estimates (Hayes, 2018, see Figure 












Bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals for the effects of the conditions on judgements of 
internal beauty indirectly via experiences of transformational ecstasy and rarefied sensations in 
turn, indicated a number of significant indirect and direct effects. When holding constant the 
rarefied sensations component, the just individual was judged to be more beautiful than the 
individual in the control condition as a result of giving rise to more transformational ecstasy (.70, 
95% CI [.43, 1.00]); the compassionate individual was judged to be  more beautiful than the control 






















Figure 2. A multiple mediation analysis showing the effect of condition on judgements 
of internal beauty via transformative ecstasy and rarefied sensations. ***= p<.001, **= 
p<.01, *= p<.05, and †= p<.1. Each coefficient in this figure is an estimate of a one-
unit change in the variable concerned on another variable (in terms of the scales used 
to measure these variables), while keeping the other variables in the model constant. 
So, for example, being in the compassion condition was estimated to result in feeling 
.77 more units of transformative ecstasy compared to being in the justice condition; 
and every one-unit increase in the transformative ecstasy felt was estimated to result in 
a .43 increase in the internal beauty scale.  
§ 
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compassionate individual was judged to be more beautiful than the just individual as a result of 
giving rise to more transformational ecstasy (.33, [.09, .60]). When holding constant the 
transformational ecstasy component, the compassionate individual was judged to be less beautiful 
than the control individual as a result of giving rise to more rarefied sensations (-.10, [-.22, -.01]). 
Overall, both the just individual and the compassionate individual were found to be more beautiful 
than the control individual via the combined effect of both components (just versus control: .64, 
[.38, .93]; compassion versus control: .93, [.63, 1.26]), and the compassionate individual was found 
to be more beautiful than the just condition via the combined effect of both components (.29, 
[.09, 51]). 
 Independently of the effect of the conditions via transformational ecstasy and rarefied 
sensations, the just individual was found to be more beautiful than the control individual (b=.51, 
t(295)=2.49, p<.05); the compassionate individual was found to be more beautiful than the control 
individual (b=.1.34, t(295)=6.38, p<.001); and the compassionate individual was found to be more 
beautiful than the just individual (b=.84, t(295)=4.60, p<.001).  
Discussion: The results indicate that the folk respond in the way that would be expected if 
the claims made in §2. are correct, and insofar as this is the case, those claims garner strong 
support.  
As expected, first, both kinds of virtuous individuals were more virtuous (and thereby 
more formally good) than the individual in the control condition. Moreover, both kinds of virtuous 
individuals were judged to be more beautiful on the inside to the extent that they were received 
with ecstasy, and specifically the transformative ecstasy component, which was indeed revealed by 
the factor analysis to be the pleasant state that virtue tends to give rise to. As such, these data 
support Moral-Beauty-Form (as per Paris [2018b, 2020]).  
Second, also as expected, Moral-Beauty-Form cannot easily accommodate all of these 
findings; Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy* is needed too. The compassionate and just individuals were not 
found to differ in terms of how virtuous they were judged to be, and so were not found to differ 
in the property expressed by BEAUTY-FORM, but the compassionate individual was found to be 
more internally beautiful than the just individual to the extent that they gave rise to ecstasy, and 
specifically the transformative component of it, presumably due to the virtue-specific features of 
compassion that tend towards ecstasy.7 
In addition to these central findings, there were two other important findings. The just and 
the compassionate individual were judged to be more internally beautiful than the control 
individual, and the compassionate individual was judged to be more internally beautiful than the 
just individual, independently of their respective tendencies to give rise to the experiences 
 
7 A reviewer suggests, on the basis of aspects of Hume’s aesthetics, that these findings may be inconclusive as the 
appreciation of the beauty of justice may require expertise in the form of e.g. recognizing that justice tends towards 
the common good, and empathizing with the beneficiaries of the just act, as well as meeting Hume’s general 
requirements for arriving at accurate judgements of taste (see e.g. Hume [1739-1740]: 498–500, 577–80; [1777]: 172–
3; and [1757]). This doesn’t strike me as convincing. Hume suggests that the recognition of the nature of justice and 
extension of empathy are also required for thinking that artificial virtues are morally good. If this is required, then 
arguably this was achieved by participants, given that they had no problem in recognizing that the person in the just 
condition is extremely good, and indeed equally good to the person in the compassion condition, just as was expected. 
Moreover, the study explicitly satisfies a number of Hume’s requirements for obtaining accurate aesthetic judgements, 
and we have no reason to think it violates those that cannot be demonstrably met by the study (such as it is), with 
perhaps the exception of the requirement for judges to have perfected their aesthetic capabilities by making 
comparisons. To give a few examples: participants who failed the attention check were excluded (and so they paid 
‘due attention’, as Hume [1757: 232] requires); the information given to participants was highly controlled across 
conditions and participants were presented with information about anonymous people in all three conditions (and so 
it is likely that the results are free from ‘prejudice’, as Hume [ibid.: 239–43] requires); and the judgements were provided 
by a large number of participants from across the United States online (with online samples, and especially samples 
from Prolific, tending to be more demographically diverse, see e.g. Peer et al. [2017]) and the judgements comported 
with those of philosophers—such as Kant and Burke—living in different countries and in a different age (and so they 
seem to be ‘durable’, as Hume [1757: 233] requires).    
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measured. To the extent that this isn’t due to measurement error—for example, some of the 
components of the ecstasy construct may not have been measured—these findings may suggest 
that there are further reasons that virtuous people are beautiful, and perhaps even further concepts 
of beauty, in addition to those that were identified in §2.  
When holding transformative ecstasy constant, the compassion condition, and perhaps the 
justice condition, tended to give rise to greater rarefied sensations to a small extent; and in the case 
of the compassion condition, this acted to slightly decrease judgements of internal beauty. One 
possibility is that the rarefied sensations component forms a principally colder aspect of the ecstasy 
response, and thereby serves to decrease attributions of moral beauty somewhat. Indeed, the chills, 
goosebumps and tears responses have been found to admit of colder varieties (e.g. Bannister 
[2019]; Maruskin et al. [2012]; Cotter, Silvia et al. [2018]); and as Kant [1764: 23] suggests, feeling 
that something is “cold” might tend to count against it being beautiful. These additional findings 
warrant further work in the future. 
§4. Is moral beauty perception dependent?  
With the argument and evidence for Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy* now laid out, in this final section I wish 
to briefly trace one important consequence of Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy*.  
Paris [2018a] and I [2021] both, briefly, make the following argument:  
 
(P1) At least some moral virtues are beautiful in themselves, 
(P2) No virtue has perceivable properties in itself,  
(C) Therefore, if a virtue is beautiful in itself, then its beauty is not perceptual, and beauty 
is not perception-dependent.  
 
For some, this conclusion will no doubt be radical; so radical, in fact, that it may require jettisoning 
the very idea that virtues are beautiful in themselves (P1).  
 I want to suggest that, contra Paris [2018b] and me [2021], at least one of the species of 
beauty that attaches to moral virtues is perceptual in a special sense; and that, to this extent, some 
moral beauty should be accepted even by those who hold to a perception-dependent conception 
of beauty. 
 The first step to seeing why this is the case comes from recognizing that emotions are 
most plausibly a special kind of perceptual experience, given that the emotions are analogous to 
more paradigmatic sensory kinds of perception in ways that allow them to perform the same kinds 
of role in our mental life.8  
Our sensory perceptual capacities are domain-specific, give rise to representations with a 
distinctive phenomenology, and provide direct access to their proprietary aspect of the world in 
virtue of the fact that the internal operation of these capacities is largely impenetrable to our beliefs 
and insensitive to our wills, and because the representations they produce are not the result of an 
inferential process. For this reason, the sensory representations produced by our sensory capacities 
provide prima facie justification for the corresponding beliefs.  
Our visual systems, for example, are sensitive to visible objects and properties (but not, 
for example, olfactory objects and properties) and produce representations with a distinctive visual 
phenomenology in a direct fashion. The sensory perceptual representation of the red object in 
front of me as red is caused directly by the red object and is not the result of any rational inference 
from, say, my knowledge of the object as having a certain reflectance profile, and the process 
producing this perceptual representation cannot be affected by my will or my beliefs about, for 
 
8 The idea that emotions are perceptions is defended by e.g. Prinz [2004], and Tappolet [2016]; and has been shown 
by e.g. Yipp [2021] to be robust against a number of the objections that have been levelled against it. 
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example, the lighting conditions. As such, the sensory perceptual representation of the object as 
red provides prima facie justification for the belief that there is a red object in front of me.  
Similarly, our emotional systems seem to be sensitive to different kinds of evaluative 
properties—with our fear systems being sensitive to frightening things and properties (but not, 
for example, offensive things and properties)—and produce representations with a distinctive 
affective phenomenology in a direct fashion. The evaluative perceptual representation of the big 
snarling dog approaching me as frightening during experiences of fear is directly caused by the dog 
and is not the result of any rational inference from, say, knowledge that the dog is a particular size, 
and the process producing this evaluative perceptual representation largely cannot be affected by 
my will or beliefs about, for example, whether the dog has been trained to merely display these 
appearances on command. As such, the evaluative perceptual representation of the dog as 
frightening provides prima facie justification for the belief that the dog is frightening.  
As such, our emotions, like our sensory perceptual systems, seem to give us direct access 
to the world, and aspects of its appearance in particular, and so are justly regarded as perceptual 
systems. If emotions are perceptions, as these considerations suggest, then why might at least some 
of the beauty of virtues be perceptual?  
As we have seen in §2., beauty in a certain thick sense has been thought to simply be the 
disposition to give rise to a certain emotion, namely ecstasy; and, as we have seen in §3, consistent 
with this view (and as per Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy*), there is evidence that the tendency to give rise to 
this emotion is sufficient for a virtue to be beautiful. As such, it is plausible that ecstasy perceives 
the beauty of virtues in the sense of BEAUTY-ECSTASY.  
Additional considerations also suggest that beauty perceives beauty in the sense of 
BEAUTY-ECSTASY. Such a view is similar to the idea, which was prominent in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century British aesthetics and developed most notably by Hutcheson [1725], that there 
is a seventh, internal, sense for detecting beauty; where this capacity’s status as a sense was thought 
to be granted by its immediacy of operation, independence of our will, innateness, and 
independence of our beliefs. Like this idea, the idea that ecstasy perceives beauty in a certain sense 
is able to accommodate a number of facts, which are related to the reasons for thinking that 
emotions are perceptions outlined above, and which suggest that beauty in the sense expressed by 
BEAUTY-ECSTASY (and perhaps more generally) is a perceptual property: including that we seem 
to be struck by beauty in the sense of BEAUTY-ECSTASY and find it in the world directly, rather than 
reasoning towards it,9 that there is something that it is like to find something beautiful in the sense 
of BEAUTY-ECSTASY, and that we at least typically need to be directly acquainted with objects to 
know whether they are beautiful in the sense of BEAUTY-ECSTASY rather than being able to rely on 
the testimony of others.  
Moreover, the view that ecstasy perceives beauty in the sense of BEAUTY-ECSTASY is also 
consistent with the fact that beauty in the sense of BEAUTY-ECSTASY is a higher-order property, 
which lies in a range of kinds of sensory, and indeed non-sensory objects, when considered 
together with the fact that the emotions perceive higher-level properties. As we have seen, the 
sound of a bittersweet sonata, the sight of a meandering river and the thought of compassion can 
be beautiful in the sense of BEAUTY-ECSTASY. The emotions generally are disanalogous from 
sensory perceptions insofar as the emotions are higher-order perceptions which can take, for 
example, visual and auditory representations as well as non-sensory representations as inputs. The 
sight of an approaching, snarling dog, the sound of a loud noise, and the thought of a global 
recession, can all induce fear, and thereby be perceived as frightening. As such, since ecstasy is an 
emotion, the view that ecstasy perceives beauty in the sense of BEAUTY-ECSTASY can elegantly 
accommodate the fact that beauty in this sense seems to be a higher-order property.10 
 
9 Even if we first need to engage in reasoning in order to come to understand how explanatory theories unify seemingly 
disparate phenomena and thereby come to apprehend their beauty. 
10 Thus, Hume’s claim that ‘beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived’ [1777: 165] is 
almost correct: beauty, at least of a certain kind, is perceived insofar as it is felt.  
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To the extent that the idea that ecstasy perceives beauty in a certain sense is also consistent 
with these additional facts, it thereby gleans support. 
If the foregoing is right, then (P2) is false: to the extent that moral traits give rise to ecstasy, 
we tend to perceive the beauty in the sense of BEAUTY-ECSTASY they possess. As a result, it doesn’t 
follow from the mere fact that at least some virtues are beautiful that their beauty is not perceptual; 
and moreover, even those who are hostile to the claim that traits can be beautiful in themselves 





I have suggested that competing accounts of which traits are beautiful, and why they are beautiful 
(when indeed they are), are in fact consistent with one another because they range over senses of 
BEAUTY that differ in their thickness—namely, BEAUTY-FORM and BEAUTY-ECSTASY. To show 
this, I have argued that ecstasy-based accounts should be formulated in a sufficient manner—
Moral-Beauty-Ecstasy*, and that this is needed in addition to Moral-Beauty-Form to explain the fact 
that compassion is more beautiful than being just. I have suggested that the truth of Moral-Beauty-
Ecstasy* has an important consequence, when considered in light of the fact that the emotions 
seem to be a kind of perception: it shows that the beauty of traits is in fact at least partly perceptual, 
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